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Abstract
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have
made releasing of synthetic images a viable
approach to share data without releasing the
original dataset. It has been shown that such
synthetic data can be used for a variety of
downstream tasks such as training classifiers that
would otherwise require the original dataset to
be shared. However, recent work has shown
that the GAN models and their synthetically
generated data can be used to infer the training set
membership by an adversary who has access to
the entire dataset and some auxiliary information.
Current approaches to mitigate this problem (such
as DPGAN (Xie et al., 2018)) lead to dramatically
poorer generated sample quality than the original
non–private GANs. Here we develop a new GAN
architecture (privGAN), where the generator is
trained not only to cheat the discriminator but
also to defend membership inference attacks.
The new mechanism provides protection against
this mode of attack while leading to negligible
loss in downstream performances. In addition,
our algorithm has been shown to explicitly
prevent overfitting to the training set, which
explains why our protection is so effective. The
main contributions of this paper are: i) we
propose a novel GAN architecture that can
generate synthetic data in a privacy preserving
manner without additional hyperparameter tuning
and architecture selection, ii) we provide
a theoretical understanding of the optimal
solution of the privGAN loss function, iii)
we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model
against several white and black–box attacks on
several benchmark datasets, iv) we demonstrate
on three common benchmark datasets that
synthetic images generated by privGAN lead to
negligible loss in downstream performance when
compared against non–private GANs. While
we have focused on benchmarking privGAN
exclusively on image datasets, the architecture
of privGAN is not exclusive to image datasets and
can be easily extended to other types of datasets.
1. Introduction
Much of the recent progress in machine learning and
related areas has been strongly dependent on the open
sharing of datasets. A recent study shows that the increase
in the number of open datasets in biology has led to a
strongly correlated increase in the number of data analysis
papers (Piwowar & Vision, 2013). Moreover, in many
specialized application areas, the development of novel
algorithms is contingent upon the public availability of
relevant data. While the public availability of data is
essential for reproducible science, in the case of sensitive
data, this poses a possible threat to the privacy of the
individuals in the dataset.
One way in which privacy of samples in a dataset can
be compromised is through membership inference attacks.
Membership inference attacks are adversarial attacks where
the goal of the adversary is to infer whether one or more
samples are a part of a dataset without having explicit
access to the dataset. There has been a lot of work on
developing membership inference attacks against predictive
machine learning models using their outputs (Shokri et al.,
2017; Long et al., 2018; Song et al., 2019; Truex et al.,
2019). Much of this work has focused on exploiting
information leakage due to overfitting in many machine
learning models (Yeom et al., 2018). These approaches
have been shown to be extremely effective against common
machine learning models and have given rise to machine
learning methods that are specifically designed to be
resistant to such attacks (Nasr et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2019;
Li et al., 2020; Salem et al., 2018).
There has recently been a surge of interest in using
synthetic data generated from generative models as a privacy
preserving way to share datasets (Han et al., 2018; Yi et al.,
2019; Zheng et al., 2018). While this is an appealing
approach, it has been shown that generative models such as
GANs are also prone to overfitting to their training set (Liu
et al., 2018). This has been exploited in several recent
papers to explore the vulnerability of generative models to
membership inference attacks (Hayes et al., 2019; Chen
et al., 2019; Hilprecht et al., 2019). (Hayes et al., 2019)
designed a white–box attack on the released discriminator
of a GAN and showed that it can be almost 100% accurate in
some cases. They also designed a black–box attack, which
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
00
07
1v
3 
 [c
s.L
G]
  3
1 M
ay
 20
20
PrivGAN: Protecting GANs from membership inference attacks at low cost
is comparatively a lot less accurate. (Hilprecht et al., 2019)
designed Monte–Carlo attacks on the generators which are
shown to have high accuracy for set membership inference
(defined later) and slightly lower accuracy for instance
membership inference.
To address this vulnerability to membership inference
attacks, we developed a novel GAN architecture namely
priv(ate)GAN to achieve membership privacy: the synthetic
data generated by the GAN trained on the training samples
should be indistinguishable from those generated by the
GAN trained on the other data points from the same
distribution. To achieve this, an adversary is trained
to attack the model, while the generator is trained to
fool both the discriminator and the adversary. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of this architecture against
attacks described in (Hayes et al., 2019; Hilprecht et al.,
2019) as well as an oracle attack on the discrminator
that we designed. We show that privGAN achieves
high membership privacy while not sacrificing the sample
quality, compared to the original GANs with identical
architecture and hyperparameter settings. Our primary
contributions in this paper are: i) proposing a novel privacy
preserving GAN architecture which requires minimal
additional hyperparameter selection and no additional
architecture choices, ii) providing a theoretical analysis
of the optimal solution to the GAN minimax problem
and demonstrating that with large enough sample size the
generative model learned with privGAN is identical to a non–
private GAN, iii) empirically comparing the performance of
our architecture against baselines on different membership
inference attacks (both on generators and discriminators),
and iv) empirically comparing the sample quality of our
generated samples with different baselines.
2. Related works
2.1. Membership inference attacks against generative
models
A membership attacker aims to infer the membership
of samples to a training set. There have been several
recent papers proposing successful membership inference
adversaries against generative models (Hayes et al., 2019;
Hilprecht et al., 2019). Both of these works were motivated
by the close connection of information leakage to overfitting.
More specifically, the generative models tend to memorize
the training samples. The success of such adversaries greatly
increases the risk to publish even synthetic datasets. To
solve this concern, We propose privGAN, and will show the
effectiveness of our method against all of these attacks in
Section 6.
2.2. Differentially private GANs
A differentially private algorithm guarantees that the
algorithm will yield similar outputs with high probability, no
matter whether a sample is included in the training dataset
or not (Dwork et al., 2014). Existing works (Xie et al., 2018;
Jordon et al., 2018) propose new algorithms guaranteeing
differential privacy of the discriminator (here the output is
the model parameters) by the introduction of systematic
noise during the model optimization steps (Abadi et al.,
2016). This also leads to a differentially private generator
as differential privacy is immune to post-processing (Dwork
et al., 2014). As a consequence, it provides a strong
protection against membership inference attacks. However,
the model has to sacrifice a lot in terms of sample quality and
diversity of synthetic images, making them not particularly
useful for practical applications. The privGAN architecture
is explicitly designed to maximize the privacy/utility trade-
off, which is quantitatively demonstrated in Section 6.
3. priv(ate)GANs
In this section, we will motivate and introduce privGANs.
In addition, we will provide the theoretical results for the
optimal generator and discriminator.
3.1. The non–private GAN
Before introducing privGANs, let us define the original
GAN. In the original (non–private) GAN, the discriminator
D and the generator G play a two-player game to
minimaximize the value function V0(G,D):
V0(G,D) =Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))],
(1)
where pz is the pre-defined input noise distribution, and
pdata is the distribution of the real data X . Here, the goal
of the generator is to learn realistic samples that can fool
the discriminator, while the goal of the discriminator is to
be able to tell generator generated samples from real ones.
The solution to the minimax problem leads to a generator
whose generated distribution is identical to the distribution
of the training dataset (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
3.2. Motivation of the privGAN architecture
Having defined the original GAN loss function, we note
that one of its major privacy risks comes from the fact
that the model tends to memorize the training samples (Liu
et al., 2018; Yeom et al., 2018). This leaves the original
GAN vulnerable to some carefully constructed adversaries.
For example, consider a situation where the trained GAN
model has been open sourced, and a larger pool containing
the training set is available to the public. (Hayes et al.,
2019) has constructed adversarial attacks that could easily
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identify the training samples using the observation that
the trained discriminator is more likely to identify training
samples as ’real’ samples than those that were not in the
training set. Similarly it has been shown in (Hilprecht et al.,
2019), that samples generated by trained generators are
more similar to images in the training set than those not in
the training set which can be utilized by an adversary to
perform membership inference.
In the classification setting (Nasr et al., 2018) demonstrated
adversarial regularization as an effective strategy to prevent
membership inference attacks. They used a built–in
adversary to identify whether a sample was a part of the
training set for the classification model or from a hold out
set. The classification model eventually learns to make
predictions that are ambigious enough to fool the adversary
while trying to maintain the classification accuracy. Here,
we adapt the same idea to generative models by introducing
a built-in adversary which the generator must fool in
addition to learning to generate realistic samples.
3.3. Attack formulation
To motivate the built–in adversary, let us first define a
generic membership inference adversary for GANs. Given
a training dataset Xtrain, a discriminator module D and a
generator module G, the goal of a generic membership
inference adversary is to learn the function f(D,G, x)
where:
Pr(x ∈ Xtrain) = f(D,G, x) (2)
In the case of attacks that utilize only the discriminator
model (e.g. the white–box attack in (Hayes et al., 2019)),
this reduces to the form:
Pr(x ∈ Xtrain) = f(D(x)) (3)
Similarly, attacks that rely only on the generator model
(e.g. the Monte–Carlo attacks described in (Hilprecht et al.,
2019)) reduce to the form:
Pr(x ∈ Xtrain) = f(G, x) (4)
In the case of attacks on generators, all known attacks (to
the best of our knowledge) rely on the distance of synthetic
generated samplesG(z) with the sample of interest x (using
some distance metric). The underlying assumption being
that if a large number of synthetic samples have a small
distance to x, then x was most likely a part of the training
set.
The privGAN architecture is motivated by such an adversary.
In addition, we demonstrate through empirical results
that a protection against such adversaries also protects
against adversaries that target discriminators. The privGAN
architecture relies on two tricks to protect against such
adversaries: i) random partitioning of the training dataset to
train multiple generator–discriminator pairs, ii) a built–in
adversary that must be fooled, whose goal is to infer which
generator generated a synthetic sample. In the following sub–
section we describe the privGAN loss highlighting these
different parts.
3.4. The mathematical formulation of privGAN
Given a hyperparameter N , we randomly divide the training
data–set X into N equal sized non–overlapping subsets:
X1, · · · , XN . Each partition of the data would be used to
train separate generator–discriminator pairs (Gi,Di) hence
their cumulative loss is simply the summation of their
individual value functions. We further introduce a built–
in adversary (called the privacy discriminator) whose goal is
to identify which generator generated the synthetic sample.
In the case of N = 2, this is a similar objective to that of the
adversary who only utilizes the generator model of a GAN.
The loss of the privacy discriminator can then be written as:
Rp(Dp) = Ez∼pz(z) log[D
i
p(Gi(z))]
where, Dp(x) = (D1p(x), · · · , DNp (x)) represents the
probability of x to be generated by the generator Gi
satisfying that
N∑
i=1
Dip(x) = 1. Hence, the complete
value function Vλ({Gi}Ni=1, {Di}Ni=1, Dp) for a privGAN
is defined as:
N∑
i=1
{
Ex∼pi(x)[log(Di(x))] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−Di(Gi(z)))]
+λEz∼pz(z) log[D
i
p(Gi(z))]
}
,
where the pi is the real data distribution of Xi for i =
1, · · · , N , pz is the pre-defined input noise distribution, λ is
a hyperparameter that controls the privacy/utility trade–off.
Figure 1A shows an illustration of the privGAN architecture
when N = 2. It is easy to see that the complete value
function takes the form :
N∑
i=1
V0(Gi, Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility
+λRp(Dp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
privacy
Here, the first term optimizes for ’utility’ (sample quality
compared to training data partition) whereas the second
term optimizes for membership privacy. Accordingly, the
optimization problem for privGANs is
min
{Gi}Ni=1
max
Dp
max
{Di}Ni=1
Vλ({Gi}Ni=1, {Di}Ni=1, Dp). (5)
In section 3.5 we will obtain the optimal solution to the
above stated optimization problem. This result will then be
used in section 3.6 to show that the the built–in adversary
acts as a regularizer which prevents over–fitting to the
training set partitions.
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Figure 1. A) The privGAN architecture with 2 generator-discriminator pairs. B) Illustration of how privGAN provides protection against
membership inference attacks by preventing overfitting to the training set.
3.5. Theoretical results for privGANs
We first provide explicit expressions for the optimal
discriminators given the generators.
Theorem 1. Fixing the generators {Gi}Ni=1 and the
hyperparameter λ > 0, the optimal discriminators of
Equation (5) are given by:
D∗i (x) =
pi(x)
pi(x) + pgi(x)
,
(Dip)
∗(x) =
pgi(x)
N∑
j=1
pgj (x)
for i = 1, · · · , N , where pgj is the distribution of Gj(z)
given z ∼ pz for j = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. Decompose the value function as
Vλ({Gi}Ni=1, {Di}Ni=1, Dp) =
N∑
i=1
V0(Gi, Di) + λ
N∑
i=1
Ez∼pz(z) log[D
i
p(Gi(z))],
where V0 is defined in Equation (1). Note that the first
term
N∑
i=1
V0(Gi, Di) only depends on {Di}Ni=1, while the
second term λEz∼pz(z) log[Dip(Gi(z))] depends on Dp
alone. By Proposition 1 (Goodfellow et al., 2014),D∗i (x) =
pi(x)
pi(x)+pgi (x)
maximizes V0(Gi, Di) for i = 1, · · · , N .
Note that
N∑
i=1
Ez∼pz(z) logD
i
p(Gi(z)) =
N∑
i=1
Ex∼pgi log[D
i
p(x)]
=
∫
x
N−1∑
i=1
pgi(x) logD
i
p(x) + pgN (x) log[1−
N−1∑
j=1
Djp(x)]dx.
Then it is equivalent to solve the optimization problem
max{yi}N−1i=1 L(y1, · · · , yN−1), where L(y1, · · · , yN−1) =
N−1∑
i=1
ai log yi + aN log[1 −
N−1∑
j=1
yj ] under the constraints
that
N−1∑
i=1
yi ∈ (0, 1) and yi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, · · · , N − 1.
It is reasonable to assume that ai ≥ 0, since the probability
density function is always positive. Easy to verify that
L(y1, · · · , yN−1) is concave, given any positive ais. Note
that y∗i =
ai
N∑
j=1
aj
for i = 1, · · · , N − 1 solves the set of
differential equations { ∂L∂yj = 0}j=1,··· ,N−1 for any positive
ais. Thus it always maximizes L(y1, · · · , yN−1) for any
positive ais, and we complete the proof.
Similar to the original GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
define
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) = max
Dp
max
{Di}Ni=1
Vλ({Gi}Ni=1, {Di}Ni=1, Dp)
Theorem 2. The minimum achievable value of
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) is −N(log 4 + λ logN) for any positive λ.
This value is achieved if and only if pgi = pi = pdata, for
i = 1, · · · , N .
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Proof. It is easy to verify that when pgi = pi = pdata
for i = 1, · · · , N , Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) achieves −N(log 4 +
λ logN).
By its definition, Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) can be re-written as:
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) =
N∑
i=1
Ex∼pi [logD∗i (x)]+
Ex∼pgi [log(1−D∗i (x))] + λEx∼pgi [log(Di∗p )(x)]
By Theorem 1 and a few algebraic manipulations, we have
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) +N(log 4 + λ logN) =
N∑
i=1
[
KL(pi||pi + pgi
2
) +KL(pgi ||
pi + pgi
2
)+
λKL(pgi ||
∑N
j=1 pgj
N
)
]
,
(6)
where KL(pa||pb) stands for the KL-divergence between
two distributions pa and pb. Note that the Jensen-Shannon
divergence (JSD) between N distributions p1, ...pN is
defined as 1N
∑N
i=1KL(pi||
∑N
j=1 pj
N ). Then, Equation (6)
turns out to be
N∑
i=1
2JSD(pi||pgi) +NλJSD(pg1 , .., pgN ) ≥ 0,
where the minimum is achieved if and only if pgi = pi,
for i = 1, · · · , N , and pg1 = · · · = pgN = pdata,
according to the property of Jensen-Shannon divergence.
Thus completing the proof.
Remark 1. Assume that pi = pdata for i = 1, · · · , N .
Given ({G∗i }Ni=1, {D∗i }Ni=1, D∗p) - the optimal solution of
Equation (5), Theorems 1 and 2 indicates that each pair in
the set{
(Gi, Di)i=1,··· ,N , (
N∑
i=1
Gi/N,
N∑
i=1
Di/N)
}
minimaximizes V0(G,D).
This remark suggests that privGANs and GANs yield the
same solution, when the data distribution of each partition
Xi is identical to that of the whole dataset X . This will be
true, if there are infinite samples in each partition Xi, and
pi equals to the underlying distribution, where the training
samples were drawn from.
3.6. privGAN loss as a regularization
In Theorem 2 and Remark 1, we have focused on the
ideal situation where we could get access to the underlying
distribution, where the training samples were drawn from. It
leaves no room for the membership inference attacks, thus a
privGAN and a GAN yield the same solution. However, in
a practical scenario, this is not true (due to unavailability of
infinitely many samples), making white–box and black–box
attacks against GANs effective. In the following lemma, we
will demonstrate that the built–in adversary (Dp) serves as a
regularizer that prevents the optimal generators (and hence
the discriminators) from memorizing the training samples.
Lemma 1. Assume that {(Gλi )∗}Ni=1 minimizes
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) for a fixed positive λ. Then minimizing
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) is equivalent as
min
{Gi}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||pgi)
Subject to:
JSD(pg1 , .., pgN ) ≤ δλ,
(7)
where pgi ∼ Gi(z) given z ∼ pz for i = 1, .., N , and
δλ = JSD(p(gλ1 )∗ , .., p(gλN )∗).
Proof. Since λ and N are fixed, reformulate
minCλ({Gi}Ni=1) as
min
{Gi}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||pgi) +
Nλ
2
JSD(pg1 , .., pgN ). (8)
Assume that {(Gλi )+}Ni=1 solves Equation (7). It also
minimizes Cλ({Gi}Ni=1), since
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||p(gλi )+) +
Nλ
2 JSD(p(gλ1 )+ , .., p(gλN )+) ≤
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||p(gλi )∗) +
Nλ
2 δλ = Cλ({(Gλi )∗}Ni=1) = minCλ({Gi}Ni=1).
We will then show that {(Gλi )∗}Ni=1 is a solution of
Equation (7). If the above assumption is not true, then
there exists {Gi}Ni=1 such that
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||pgi) <
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||p(gλi )∗), and JSD(pg1 , .., pgN ) ≤ δλ.
Then
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||pgi) + Nλ2 JSD(pg1 , .., pgN ) <
N∑
i=1
JSD(pi||p(gλi )∗) + Nλ2 δλ = Cλ({(Gλi )∗}Ni=1) =
minCλ({Gi}Ni=1). This contradicts the assumption that
{(Gλi )∗}Ni=1 minimizes Cλ({Gi}Ni=1). This completes the
proof.
Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 provide an intuitive understanding
of the properties of the optimal generator distributions.
More specifically, it has been shown that the cost function
Cλ({Gi}Ni=1) reduces to a trade off between the distance of
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generator distributions and their corresponding data split,
and their distance to the other generator distributions. On
the one hand, the privacy discriminator can be seen as
a regularization to prevent generators from memorizing
their corresponding data split. On the other hand, a
privGAN will yield the same solution as a non–private
GAN when there is low risk of overfitting, as suggested by
Remark 1. This interesting observation further demonstrates
the effectiveness of our protection, as the success of all
kinds of membership inference attacks heavily rely on the
extent of overfitting. In addition, the reformulation of the
optimization problem for the generators (seen in Lemma 1)
provides a more explicit way to bound the distance between
the generator distributions, which can be explored in future
work to provide privacy guarantees.
3.7. Practical implementation of privGAN architecture
For the purposes of practical implementation of privGAN
we just duplicated the discriminator and generator
architectures of the simple GAN for all the component
generator–discriminator pairs of privGAN. The privacy
discriminator is identical in architecture to other
discriminators barring the activation of the final layer, which
is soft–max instead of sigmoid (in other discriminators).
Identical learning rates are used as in the simple GAN.
Hence, the only additional hyperparameters in privGAN
are λ and the number of generator–discriminator pairs N .
3.8. Training privGAN
The overall training algorithm for privGAN can be seen in
Algorithm 1. While an alternating minimization strategy
seems like a reasonable choice for training the privGAN,
there are several practical tricks that can accelerate the
convergence. The first trick is to set up good initial weights
for the privacy discriminator (Dp). We first train a neural
network to distinguish the different partitions of the training
data (corresponding to each generator) for a small number
of epochs ni (here we used 50). Then initialize Dp with
this neural network. The second trick is to fix Dp for the
first nd epochs (here we used 100) after the initialization,
while only allowing the generator-discriminator pairs to
train. These two strategies have been shown to accelerate the
convergence. In addition, the learning curves for different
combinations of ni and nd are presented in Figure 2. Setting
nd = 0 leads to big initial transients in the combined loss
which eventually subsides. A possible explanation is that
it is too hard for the generators to beat both discriminators
and the privacy discriminator at the very beginning. The
effect of setting ni = 0 is less dramatic when nd = 100.
However, the convergence of the combined loss could be
accelerated by setting ni = 50, when nd = 0. Note that Dp
will be initialized with random weights by setting ni = 0.
Last but not least, the relative values of the various losses
after 200 epochs are quite stable to the choice of ni and nd,
as shown in Figure 2. Note - ni = 50 and nd = 100 are
used in all experiments performed in the following sections.
Algorithm 1 Training privGAN
Input: Dataset X with m samples, array of generators
G, array of discriminators D, privacy discriminator Dp,
privacy weight λ, number of epochs n, initial Dp epochs
ni, co-training delay nd
N ← number of discriminators/generators
Divide X into N equal parts {X1, ..XN}
yp ← partition index of each data point
for i = 1 to ni do
Train one epoch of Dp with (X, yp)
end for
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to N do
Xfj ← fake images generated with Gj
yfj ← random numbers in [1, N ] excluding j
yj ← labels for fake and real images
Xˆj = {Xj , Xfj }
Train one epoch of Dj with (Xˆj , yj)
end for
Xf ← {Xf1 , ..XfN}
yfp ← {yf1 , ..yfN}
if i ≥ nd then
Train one epoch of Dp with (Xf , yp)
end if
Train one epoch of G with (Xf , yfp, yp, λ)
end for
4. Proposed attacks
In this section, we will introduce several state-of-the-art
membership inference attacks against generative models as
well as an oracle attack of our own. Although the privGAN
is specifically designed to defend against membership
inference attacks targeting generators (or generated data),
we also present other adversaries that attack released
discriminator models for completeness.
4.1. White–box attack on discriminator
The white–box attack on a simple GAN is performed as
outlined in (Hayes et al., 2019). Briefly, the attack assumes
that the adversary is in possession of the trained model along
with a large data pool including the training samples. The
attacker is also assumed to have the knowledge of what
fraction of the dataset was used for training (say f ) but no
other information about the training set. The attack then
proceeds by using the discriminator of the trained GAN to
obtain a probability score for each sample in the dataset (see
Algorithm 2). The samples are then sorted in descending
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Figure 2. Comparing the loss convergence for different model training hyper–parameters of privGAN on the MNIST dataset with λ = 1.
order of probability score and the top f fraction of the scores
are outputted as the likely training set. The evaluation of the
white–box attack is done by calculating what fraction of the
predicted training set was actually in the training set.
Algorithm 2 White-box attack on GAN
Input: Dataset X with m samples, discriminator D
for i = 1 to m do
p(Xi)← D(Xi)
end for
return p
Since a privGAN model has multiple generator–
discriminator pairs, the previously described attack
cannot be directly applied to it. However, for a successful
white–box attack, each of the discriminators should score
samples from the training corpus higher than those not
used in training (note: the training sets are of the same
size for both private and non–private GANs). Hence,
we modify the previous approach by identifying a ’max’
probability score by taking the max over the scores from
all discriminators (see Algorithm 3). The rationale being
that the discriminator which has trained on a particular data
sample should have the largest discriminator score. We
now proceed to sort the samples by each of these aggregate
scores and select the top f fraction samples as the predicted
training set, which is similar to Algorithm 3. We also tried
taking ’mean’ instead of ’max’ which led to largely similar
results, hence we only report the results for the ’max’ attack
here.
Algorithm 3 White-box attack on privGAN
Input: Dataset X with m samples, array of
discriminators D
N ← number of discriminators
for i = 1 to m do
{p1(Xi), .., pN (Xi)} ← {D1(Xi), .., DN (Xi)}
end for
pmax ← max(p1, .., pN )
return pmax
4.2. Oracle white–box attack on discriminator
While we describe a particular white–box attack targeting
discriminator models from (Hayes et al., 2019) in the
previous sub–section, there are many more such white–
box attacks possible. A detailed analysis of all possible
attacks is beyond the scope of this paper, but a taxonomy of
possible attacks can be found in (Chen et al., 2019). While
the previously described white–box attack is an intuitive
heuristic for a practical scenario, here we seek to identify
the upper limit of membership inference accuracy of white–
box attacks based solely on discriminator scores. This will
enable us to better quantify the privacy loss due to GANs.
We first define the following notations:
• Xtrain is the training set for the GAN, and Xho is the
holdout set
• D(·) is the discriminator
• x ∈ Xtrain ∪Xho, is a sample which may or may not
have been used to train the GAN.
• X is a random number drawn uniformly fromXtrain∪
Xho
• D = {D(x)|x ∈ Xtrain ∪Xho}, and M is the size of
D. Sort the set D in the ascending order, and define di
as its ith element for i = 1, · · · ,M .
• A(D(x)) ∈ {0, 1} is an adversary to infer the
membership of a sample x using D(x). More
specifically, A(D(x)) = 1 means that the adversary
classifies the sample x as a training sample, otherwise
it is classified into the holdout setXho (A(D(x)) = 0).
• The utility score ∆ of a membership inference attack
A at a sample x is:
∆A(x) =
{
1, if membership correctly identified
−1, otherwise
• pi = Pr(D(X) = di|X ∈ Xtrain)
• qi = Pr(D(X) = di|X ∈ Xho)
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• f = Pr(X ∈ Xtrain) = |Xtrain||Xtrain|+|Xho|
• si = Pr(D(X) = di) = pif + qi(1− f)
• λi = Pr(X ∈ Xtrain|D(X) = di) = pifpif+qi(1−f)
• δAi = A(D(di))
Note that {pi, qi}i=1,··· ,M could exactly describe the
probability distribution of D(X) given X ∈ Xtrain or
X ∈ Xho. Thus, we are making no assumption about
the distribution of D(X). Next, we identify the maximum
expected value of ∆ for any adversary with access to pi, qi
and f .
Theorem 3. The maximum expected value of ∆ is given by:
max
A
EX [∆A(X)] =
M∑
i=1
|pif − qi(1− f)|
Proof. The expected value of ∆ is given by:
EX [∆A(X)] = 1× Pr(correct prediction by A)−
1× Pr(wrong prediction by A) (9)
=
M∑
i=1
[λiδ
A
i + (1− λi)(1− δAi )− (1− λi)δAi −
λi(1− δAi )]si
(10)
The optimal attack strategy is given by the following Integer
Programming (IP) formulation:
A∗ = arg max
A
M∑
i=1
[λiδ
A
i + (1− λi)(1− δAi )
− (1− λi)δAi − λi(1− δAi )]si
subject to:
δAi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ {1, ..M}
(11)
This can be simplified to the following IP formulation:
{(δAi )?}Mi=1 = arg max{δAi }Mi=1
M∑
i=1
(2λi − 1)δAi si
subject to:
δAi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ {1, ..M}
(12)
It is easy to see that this IP has an analytical solution given
by:
δAi
?
=
{
1, if λi ≥ 12
0, λi <
1
2
,∀i ∈ {1, ..,M} (13)
We note that the condition λi ≥ 12 is equivalent to pi ≥
1−f
f qi.
Using {(δAi )?}Mi=1, we find the maximum value of
EX [∆A(X)] to be:
maxEX [∆A(X)] =
M∑
i=1
[λi1pi≥ 1−ff qi + (1− λi)1qi< 1−ff pi
− (1− λi)1pi≥ 1−ff qi − λi1qi< 1−ff pi ]si
=
M∑
i=1
[(2λi − 1)1pi≥ 1−ff qi+
(1− 2λi)1qi< 1−ff pi ]si
=
M∑
i=1
|pif − qi(1− f)|
(14)
It should be noted that such an oracle attack has a
EX [∆A(X)]max = |2f − 1| ≥ 0 even when P =
Q. We further show in Lemma 2 that for f = 12 ,
EX [∆A(X)]max = TV D(P,Q), where TVD stands for
the Total Variation Distance between the distributions P
and Q (Dudley, 2010).
Lemma 2. The maximum expected value of ∆ is for f = 12
is equal to the Total Variation Distance between probability
distributions P and Q, where P is the distribution of
discriminator scores given x ∈ Xtest while where Q is
the distribution of discriminator scores given x ∈ Xho.
Proof. In the case of f = 12 , the condition λi ≥ 12 is
equivalent to pi ≥ qi. Hence, equation 14 can be re–written
as:
maxEX [∆A(X)] =
1
2
M∑
i=1
|pi − qi| (15)
This is equal to the Total Variation Distance between
probability distributions P and Q (Q.E.D.).
Based on the previously stated observations, we use Total
Variation Distance between the distribution of discriminator
scores for Xtest and Xho to robustly quantify effectiveness
of an attacker that only uses discriminator scores as
described in Algorithm 4. Note - In the practical scenario,
since the number of samples used in training are limited, we
bin the discriminator scores into equally spaced bins and
calculate the TVD on the resulting distributions.
Similar to the white–box attack described in the previous
sub–section, this attack doesn’t work directly on privGAN
due to the presence of multiple discriminators. Hence,
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Algorithm 4 TVD attack on GAN
Input: Datasets Xtrain and Xho , discriminator D,
number of bins M
pi ← D(Xi),∀i ∈ {1, |Xtrain|}
qi ← D(Xi),∀i ∈ {1, |Xho|}
P ← probability distribution of pi with the range [0, 1]
discretized into M equal bins
Q ← probability distribution of qi with the range [0, 1]
discretized into M equal bins
return TV D(P,Q)
we modify the attack by taking the maximum TVD of
the distribution of discriminator scores for Xtest and Xho
among all discriminators (Algorithm 5).
Algorithm 5 TVD attack on privGAN
Input: DatasetsXtrain andXho , array of discriminators
D, number of bins M
for j = 1 to |D| do
pij ← Dj(Xi),∀i ∈ {1, |Xtrain|}
P j ← probability distribution of pij with the range
[0, 1] discretized into M equal bins
qij ← Dj(Xi),∀i ∈ {1, |Xho|}
Qj ← probability distribution of qij with the range
[0, 1] discretized into M equal bins
end for
return maxj(TV D(P j , Qj))
4.3. Monte–Carlo attack on generator
While the previous two sub–sections describe attacks on
GANs that rely on using the discriminator scores to infer
training set membership, it has been shown in (Hilprecht
et al., 2019) that generators of GANs are also vulnerable
to membership inference attacks. (Hilprecht et al., 2019)
describes two attacks against generators, namely, instance
membership inference and set membership inference.
Instance membership inference is shown to work only
marginally better than random chance guessing, while set
membership inference was shown to be very effective in
multiple datasets. Hence, in this paper we restrict ourselves
to the set membership inference attack on generators only.
In a set membership attack, we are given two sets of samples.
All samples in one set have the desired membership, while
all samples in the other set do not have said membership.
The goal of the attacker is to identify which of the two sets
contain samples with the desired membership. In the context
of attacks against generative models, the goal is to identify
the set that was part of the training set for the model.
Algorithm 6 lays out the set membership inference algorithm
described in (Hilprecht et al., 2019). The attack works
Algorithm 6 Monte–Carlo set membership attack on
GAN/privGAN
Input: Datasets Xtrain and Xho , set size m, synthetic
dataset X of size n, distance metric d, epsilon 
S1 ←, random subset of Xtrain of size m
S0 ←, random subset of Xho of size m
y ← []
for j = 1 to m do
fS1, =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1xi∈US1,(xi)
fS0, =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1xi∈US0,(xi)
if fS1, ≥ fS0, then
y[i] = 1
else
y[i] = 0
end if
end for
if Sum(y) > m2 then
return 1
else if Sum(y) < m2 then
return 0
else
return Bernoulli(0.5)
end if
by using the generator to generate some n number of
samples (or using n generator generated samples if only
samples are available). For each sample in the two
sets whose memberships are being tested, we calculate
1
n
∑n
i=1 1xi∈USi,(xi), where U(x) = {x′|d(x, x′) ≤ }.
The authors find that the most effective distance is the a
PCA based one. Where the top 40 principal components
of the vectorized images in a held out set is first computed.
To calculate the distance d between two images x and x′,
the PCA transformation is used to first compute the 40
principal components of interest. An euclidean distance is
then computed between these reduced dimension vectors.
The authors also prescribe several heuristics for choosing
. The most effective heuristic is shown to be the median
heuristic:
 = median
1≤i≤2m
( min
1≤j≤n
d(xi, gj))
Here gj refers to the jth generated sample. It should be
noted that since all 3 of the datasets used in (Hilprecht et al.,
2019) are also used in our paper, we select the best heuristics
found in the paper.
5. Experiment details
5.1. Datasets used
We use the following standard open datasets for our
experiments: i) MNIST, ii) fashion–MNIST, iii) CIFAR-10,
and iv) Labeled Faces in Wild (LFW). MNIST and fashion–
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MNIST are grayscale datasets of size 70, 000 (60, 000
training samples, 10, 000 test samples). MNIST comprises
of images of handwritten digits, while fashion–MNIST
contains images of simple clothing items. They contain
a balanced number of samples from 10 classes of images.
CIFAR-10 is a colored (RGB) dataset of everyday objects of
size 60, 000 (50, 000 training samples, 10, 000 test samples).
LFW is a dataset of size 13, 223 comprising of faces of
individuals. We use the grayscale version of the dataset
made available through scikit–learn.
Figure 3. Comparison of predicted scores by discriminators during
white box attack on privGAN and non-private GANs for the various
datasets. In the case of privGAN, the scores from one randomly
selected discriminator. ’Train’ refers to scores of data points in the
training set, while ’test’ refers to scores of data points not in the
training set.
5.2. Modeling and optimization
For MNIST, MNIST-fashion and LFW, we use standard fully
connected networks for both generators and discriminators
since these are relatively simple datasets. The generator
and discriminator architecture details can be found in
the Supplementary Methods. Identical generator and
discriminator architectures are used for both GANs and
privGANs. In the comparisons with DPGANs we use an
identical architecture as detailed in Supplementary Methods.
While evaluating the different adversarial attacks, we trained
all GAN models with an Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014)
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0002 (β = 0.5) for
500 epochs. While evaluating performance on downstream
classification tasks, we train all GAN models with an Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0002 (β = 0.5) for
200 epochs (except in CIFAR–10 where we train for 400
epochs as it is a much more complicated dataset). For the
classifier, we use simple CNN models (see architecture in
Supplementary Methods). For the CNN models, we still
used a learning rate of 0.0002 but trained for 50 epochs
instead since the model converges quickly. In all cases we
used a batch–size of 256.
To test the efficiency of white–box and TVD attacks, models
were trained on 10% of the data as in (Hayes et al., 2019).
In the case of the Monte–Carlo attack, we first separated
out the ’test set’ for all datasets and used it only to compute
the principal components as described in (Hilprecht et al.,
2019). 100, 000 synthetic samples (n) were used in the
Monte–Carlo attack. 10% of the rest of the dataset was then
used to train models while the model was evaluated on all
the data except the held out test set. Reported numbers are
averages over 10 runs. For each run, 10% of the dataset
was randomly chosen to be the training set. In the case of
the Monte–Carlo attack, 10 attacks were performed per run
of model training and their average accuracy was taken (as
in (Hilprecht et al., 2019)). For the task of evaluating the
downstream performance of GANs, a separate generative
model was trained for each class of the training dataset.
Here the training dataset refers to the pre–defined training
set available for MNIST, MNIST–fashion and CIFAR–10.
6. Results
6.1. Comparison of privacy loss under the proposed
attacks
A qualitative way to evaluate how well GANs are protected
against white–box attacks is visually comparing the
distribution of discriminator scores for samples in the
training set with samples outside of the training set. The
more similar the distributions are, the harder it is for an
adversary to tell the samples apart. For a privGAN, since
there are multiple discriminators, we can look at the outputs
of a randomly chosen discriminator instead. In Figure 3 we
see that the privGAN does indeed make the two distributions
closer and the similarity between the distributions increases
with λ. On the other hand, for a non–private GAN, the
two distributions are very different which explains the high
accuracy of white–box attacks in their case.
To quantitatively compare the privacy loss of privGANs
with the baselines, we performed several attacks described
in section 4. The first is a white–box attack as described
previously. In the case of a white–box attack, since the
privGAN has multiple generator/discriminator pairs, we
describe a modified attack that is designed specifically for
privGANs (see Algorithm 3). For each dataset, we train
the GAN and privGANs (for λ = 0.1, 1, 10) on 10% of
the dataset. The goal of the white–box attack is to then
identify the training set from the complete dataset. Table 1
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Figure 4. Comparison of images generated by non-private GAN with privGAN for different values of λ. We see a gradual drop in quality
of images with increasing values of λ.
shows that increasing λ generally leads to reduction in
the accuracy of white–box attacks. This indicates that a
privGAN becomes more resistant to membership inference
attacks, as λ becomes larger. Moreover, even for a small
λ = 0.1, the privGAN leads to substantial decrease in
accuracy of the white–box attack when compared to the
non–private GAN for all datasets. In all cases, the privGAN
model corresponding to the best performing value of λ
yields comparable performance to the random chance. We
also find that for reasonable values of  (25, 100), the white–
box attack accuracy for DPGANs is similar to privGANs
with λ = 10 (see Supplementary Table 1).
Dataset Rand. GAN privGAN
λ = 0.1 λ = 1 λ = 10
MNIST 0.1 0.467 0.144 0.12 0.096
f-MNIST 0.1 0.527 0.192 0.192 0.095
LFW 0.1 0.724 0.148 0.107 0.086
CIFAR-10 0.1 0.723 0.568 0.424 0.154
Table 1. White–box attack accuracy of various models on various
datasets. For privGAN, the number represents accuracy of the
’max’ attack.
While not a practical attack, the Total Variation Distance
between the distribution of scores on the training and
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held out set provide an upper limit to the efficacy of
discriminator score based white–box attacks against GANs
(see Algorithm 4). It can be seen as an attack with an oracle
adversary. Like in the previous case, this is complicated
in the case of privGAN due to the presence of multiple
generator–discriminator pairs. We mitigated this by taking
the largest Total Variation Distance among all discriminators
(see Algorithm 5. Similar to the previous attack, we trained
the GAN and privGANs (for λ = 0.1, 1, 10) on 10% of
the dataset. We find again that for all datasets and all three
values of λ, privGAN leads to considerable reduction in
Total Variation Distance (Table 2). Moreover, an increase in
λ is seen to generally lead to reduction in the Total Variation
Distance.
Dataset GAN privGAN
λ = 0.1 λ = 1 λ = 10
MNIST 0.438 0.31 0.235 0.048
f-MNIST 0.674 0.323 0.278 0.155
LFW 0.756 0.237 0.097 0.261
CIFAR-10 0.91 0.371 0.367 0.244
Table 2. TVD attack score of various models on various datasets.
While the previous two attacks are attacks against the
discriminator, the final attack is one against the trained
generators and only uses synthetic generated images.
Moreover, unlike the previous two attacks which were
instance membership inference attacks, this is a set
membership inference attack (described previously). The
attack (Algorithm 6), first described in (Hilprecht et al.,
2019), is a Monte–Carlo attack that tries to perform set
membership inference under the assumption that generated
images will be more similar to the image set used to train
them. As seen in the previous two attacks, privGAN
outperforms GAN for all three values of λ and set
membership inference accuracy decreases as a function of
λ ((Table 3)).
Dataset Rand. GAN privGAN
λ = 0.1 λ = 1 λ = 10
MNIST 0.5 0.79 0.71 0.68 0.56
f-MNIST 0.5 0.75 0.73 0.7 0.64
LFW 0.5 0.77 0.66 0.57 0.55
CIFAR-10 0.5 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.52
Table 3. Monte–Carlo attack accuracy of various models on
various datasets.
6.2. Comparison of downstream performance against
non-private GANs
We compare the downstream performance of privGANs
against non–private GANs in two ways: i) qualitative
comparison of the generated images, ii) quantitative
comparison on a downstream classification task.
Figure 5. Comparison of test–set performance of CNN models
trained real data, synthetic data generated using GAN and synthetic
data generated using privGAN. Numbers in brackets indicate λ
values for privGAN and  values for DPGAN.
For the first task we qualitatively compare the quality of
images generated by privGANs with different settings of λ
to those generated by non–private GANs as seen in Figure 4.
It is easy to see that the image quality for all three λ values
(0.1, 1, 10) are quite comparable to the images generated by
non–private GANs. However, it can be seen that the image
quality does decrease as we increase λ. We also see that
certain classes become overrepresented as λ increases. This
will be studied in greater detail in the following section.
To quantitatively test the downstream performance, we split
the pre–defined training set for MNIST, MNIST–fashion and
CIFAR by its class and trained privGANs (λ = 0.1, 1, 10)
for each single class. We then generated the same number
of samples per class as in the original training set to create
a new synthetic training set(each image was generated
by a randomly chosen generator). This training set was
used to train a CNN classification model, which was then
tested on the pre–defined test sets for each dataset. The
baselines used for comparison were: i) CNN trained on
the real training set, ii) CNN trained on a training set
generated by a non–private GAN. Figure 5 shows that the
classification accuracy decreases, as λ increases. However,
the decrease is almost negligible with λ = 0.1, 1 compared
to the non–private GAN for both MNIST and MNIST–
fashion. Besides, a comparison with DPGAN (for 100)
shows that privGAN leads to far higher downstream utility
than DPGAN for a reasonably large value of . While
privGANs outperforms DPGANs for all three values of λ,
we note that the comparison is not fair since DPGAN is
known to provide a rather conservative privacy guarantees
and isn’t specifically designed with membership privacy
in mind. Hence, a more fair comparison is between the
privacy providing mechanism used in DPGAN (gradient
clipping with gaussian noise addition) with that of privGAN.
To do this, we do a white–box accuracy vs downstream
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accuracy plot for a wide range of λ (for privGAN) and
 (for DPGAN) values. (Note: This experiment was
only performed on MNIST and fashion–MNIST due to
computational considerations) We find that in both datasets,
privGAN has higher utility for similar privacy for most
of the privacy loss range as seen in Figure 6. It is also
interesting to note that the privacy loss range for privGAN
is somewhat smaller than DPGAN. This may indicate that
simply sub-sampling the data already provides some amount
of membership privacy.
Figure 6. Comparison of utility vs privacy between privGAN and
DPGAN.
6.3. Effect of privGAN hyper–parameters on sample
quality
Figure 7. Comparison of the effect of hyper–parameters on average
entropy and class diversity for MNIST.
To test the effect of the hyper–parameter choices on sample
quality we focus on two attributes: i) unambiguity of the
class of the generated images, ii) relative abundance of
different classes in generated images. We measure the
unambiguity of the class of the generated images using
the entropy of the predicted class probabilities (using a
CNN trained on real images). The average entropy of the
entire dataset is then reported for different hyper–parameter
settings (lower average entropy represents less ambiguity
of image class). The class diversity of generated images is
measured by using the pre–trained CNN to first identify the
most probable class per sample and then using it to calculate
the relative abundance of each class in the generated dataset
(scaled to sum to 1). We then calculate the entropy of
the relative class abundance which we report as the class
diversity (higher entropy represents larger class diversity).
We see in Figure 7 that as λ (fixing number of generators
to 2) is increased, both average entropy and class diversity
monotonically decrease. This implies that as λ increases,
the class ambiguity of the samples increases, while the
class diversity decreases. As the number of generators is
increased (fixing λ = 0.1) we notice a monotonic increase
of average entropy. This increase in average entropy is
accompanied by an increase in class diversity (although the
increase is not monotonic). This in turn implies that as
the number of generators increases, the class ambiguity of
samples decreases along with an increase in class diversity.
Here it must be noted that as the number of generators is
increased (for a fixed dataset size), the size of each data split
decreases.
Based on these results, it can be summarized that both
λ and the number of generators impact the quality of
samples generated by privGAN. Since these two parameters
interact, the optimal value of these hyperparameters are
inter–dependent and most likely dependent on the dataset.
7. Practical considerations for data/model
sharing
While the interplay between privacy and synthetic
data sharing has been extensively discussed
academically (Bellovin et al., 2019), much of the
discussion has focused on the utility vs privacy trade–off.
However, there is a lack of discussion on when it is
appropriate to share models and when it is recommended
to share just synthetic data. These release choices can
dramatically affect privacy concerns as different attacks
against GANs can have vastly different success rates. In
our case this is further complicated because privGAN has
multiple generator discriminator pairs. Here we discuss
some practical considerations for synthetic data sharing as
well as model sharing in the case of privGAN.
7.1. Synthetic data sharing
Synthetic data sharing is the most desirable when possible
as it only allows for black box attacks which are generally
considered less effective than white box attacks for
GANs (Hayes et al., 2019). While synthetic data sharing is
relatively straightforward for non–private GANs, it is more
complicated in the case of privGAN due to the presence
of multiple generators, each of which may have lead to a
slightly different generated distribution. Releasing images
generated by any one generator may reduce the diversity
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of shared data, particularly for low values of λ. A smart
sampling strategy from multiple generators would increase
the diversity of the generated samples and would likely make
it harder for adversaries to construct a black box attack. A
relative privacy vs utility comparison of these approaches is
beyond the scope of this paper and may form the basis for
future work.
7.2. Model sharing
While sharing synthetic data should be generally more
preferable to model sharing from a privacy standpoint, in
many situations this is not possible. Moreover, it is standard
practice in many academic fields to share models for the
sake of reproducible research. In such circumstances, it
is strongly recommended to not share the Dp (privacy
discriminator) module of privGAN. SinceDp serves the role
of an in–built adversary in privGAN, it’s ability to predict
which generator generated a particular synthetic sample
could be utilized by an adversary to infer membership.
Additionally, one may consider releasing one or a sub–set of
generator–discriminator pairs instead of all pairs to further
enhance membership privacy.
8. Conclusion
Here we present a novel GAN framework (named privGAN)
that utilizes multiple generator-discriminator pairs and a
built–in adversary to prevent the model from overfitting
to the training set. Through a theoretical analysis of the
optimal generator/discriminators, we demonstrate that the
results are identical to those of a non–private GAN. We
also demonstrate in the more practical scenario where the
training data is a sample of the entire dataset, the privGAN
loss function is equivalent to a regularization to prevent
overfitting to the training set. The regularization provided
by privGAN could also lead to an improved learning of the
data distribution, which will be the focus of future work.
To demonstrate the utility of privGAN, we focus on the
application of preventing membership inference attacks
against GANs. We demonstrate that while non–private
GANs are highly vulnerable to such attacks, privGAN
provides strong protection against such attacks. While
we focus on a few state–of–the–art white–box and black–
box attacks in this paper, we argue that due to the
intrinsic regularization effect provided by privGAN (see
Section 3.6) this would generalize to other attacks as well.
We also demonstrate that compared to another popular
defense against such attacks (DPGAN), privGAN minimally
affects the quality of downstream samples as evidenced
by the performance on downstream learning tasks such as
classification. We also characterize the effect of different
privGAN hyper–parameters on sample quality, measured
through two different metrics.
While the major focus of the current paper has been to
characterize the properties of privGANs and empirically
show the protection it provides to white–box attacks,
future work could focus on finding theoretical guarantees
due to our approach. The privGAN architecture could
also have applications in related areas such as transfer
learning. Hence another direction of future work could
be focused on extending privGAN to such application areas
and demonstrating the benefits in practical datasets.
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Appendix 1: Model architectures and hyper–parameters
Here we outline the different layers used in the model architectures for different datasets, along with associated optimization
hyper–parameters. It is important to note that the same choices are made for non–private GAN, privGAN as well as DPGAN
in all cases. Note that layers are in sequential order.
MNIST & MNIST–fashion
GENERATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 512, input size= 100)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1024)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 784, activation = ’tanh’)
DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 2048)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 256)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1, activation = ’sigmoid’)
PRIVACY–DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 2048)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 256)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units = number of generators, activation = ’softmax’)
An Adam optimizer with β = 0.5 and a learning rate of 0.0002 was used for optimization.
LFW
GENERATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 512, input size= 100)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1024)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 2914, activation = ’tanh’)
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DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 2048)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 256)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1, activation = ’sigmoid’)
PRIVACY–DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 2048)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 512)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 256)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units = number of generators, activation = ’softmax’)
An Adam optimizer with β = 0.5 and a learning rate of 0.0002 was used for optimization.
CIFAR–10
GENERATOR LAYERS
• Dense(units= 2048, input size= 100, target shape= (2, 2, 512))
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 256, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 64, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2DTranspose(filters= 3, kernel size= 5, strides= 2, activation = ’tanh’)
DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Conv2D(filters= 64, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• Reshape(target shape= (2, 2, 512))
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 256, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units= 1, activation = ’sigmoid’)
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PRIVACY–DISCRIMINATOR LAYERS
• Conv2D(filters= 64, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• Reshape(target shape= (2, 2, 512))
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 128, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Conv2D(filters= 256, kernel size= 5, strides= 2)
• LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
• Dense(units = number of generators, activation = ’softmax’)
An Adam optimizer with β = 0.5 and a learning rate of 0.0002 was used for optimization.
CNN classifier for MNIST & MNIST–fashion
• Conv2D(filters= 32, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Conv2D(filters= 32, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Max–pooling(pool size= 2)
• Dense(units= 128, activation = ’relu’)
• Dense(units= 10, activation = ’soft–max’)
An Adam optimizer with β = 0.5 and a learning rate of 0.0002 was used for optimization.
CNN classifier for CIFAR–10
• Conv2D(filters= 32, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Conv2D(filters= 32, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Max–pooling(pool size= 2)
• Dropout(0.25)
• Conv2D(filters= 64, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Conv2D(filters= 64, kernel size= 3, activation = ’relu’)
• Max–pooling(pool size= 2)
• Dropout(0.25)
• Dense(units= 512, activation = ’relu’)
• Dropout(0.5)
• Dense(units= 10, activation = ’soft–max’)
An Adam optimizer with β = 0.5 and a learning rate of 0.0002 was used for optimization.
DPGAN hypterparameters and implementation
To make the architectures identical, we replaced the Wasserstein loss in DPGAN with the original GAN loss. In the
implementation of DPGAN, there are several additional hyper–parameters. In all our experiments, we have set δ = 1/N ,
where N is the sample size of the dataset (this is considered standard practice). Furthermore, for each discriminator iteration,
we performed 1 iteration of the generator for the sake of consistency with GAN and privGAN. DPGAN was implemented
using the Tensorflow Privacy package (https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy).
Appendix 2: Complete table of white–box attack efficiencies
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Dataset Rand. GAN privGAN (λ = 0.1) privGAN (λ = 1.0) privGAN (λ = 10.0) DPGAN (100) DPGAN (25)
MNIST 0.1 0.467 0.144 0.12 0.096 0.098 0.1
f-MNIST 0.1 0.527 0.192 0.192 0.095 0.102 0.099
LFW 0.1 0.724 0.148 0.107 0.086 0.109 0.097
CIFAR-10 0.1 0.723 0.568 0.424 0.154 0.107 0.098
Table 4. White box attack accuracy of various models on various datasets.
Dataset GAN privGAN (λ = 0.1) privGAN (λ = 1.0) privGAN (λ = 10.0) DPGAN (100) DPGAN (25)
MNIST 0.438 0.31 0.235 0.048 0.021 0.024
f-MNIST 0.674 0.323 0.278 0.155 0.022 0.025
LFW 0.756 0.237 0.097 0.261 0.04 0.045
CIFAR-10 0.91 0.371 0.367 0.244 0.01 0.008
Table 5. TVD attack score of various models on various datasets.
Dataset Rand. GAN privGAN (λ = 0.1) privGAN (λ = 1.0) privGAN (λ = 10.0) DPGAN (100) DPGAN (25)
MNIST 0.5 0.79 0.71 0.68 0.56 0.62 0.6
f-MNIST 0.5 0.75 0.73 0.7 0.64 0.52 0.56
LFW 0.5 0.77 0.66 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.49
CIFAR-10 0.5 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.63 0.57
Table 6. Monte–Carlo attack accuracy of various models on various datasets.
